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Summary
Cohesive society, trust and social cooperation are among the social arrangements and 
meta-institutions required for building good institutions and a well-managed state. 
Before the global financial crisis, Hungary was characterized by unsustainable public 
finances, a flawed and irresponsible fiscal policy, and consequently, weak economic 
fundamentals. This represented a suboptimal state management, with the basics of co-
operation between the state and the economic actors were seriously damaged. For this 
reason, by the beginning of the decade, the renewal of state management and, above all, 
public finances had become imperative. The first step was the adoption of the Funda-
mental Law (new constitution), including a chapter on public finances. The stabilization 
of Hungarian public finances is built on the Fundamental Law and the debt rule, and the 
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monetary policy reforms (after 2013) and improvement in competitiveness (launched in 
recent years, but partly ahead of us) can also be associated with these regulations. The 
renewal of public finances after 2010 enables a lasting and effective cooperation between 
the Hungarian state and the economic actors. The new cooperative framework needs to 
be institutionalized and can be an appropriate basis for the creation of a well-managed 
state and an attitude change potentially leading to a state management actively leverag-
ing positive incentives and seeking partnership with the relevant stakeholders. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: H03, H21 E02, H83
Keywords: public finances, fiscal policy, monetary policy, institutional system, macro-
economics, behaviour of economic actors, cooperation
Introduction
Large government deficit, increasing sovereign debt, the private sector running into 
debt, high taxes, high tax evasion, low employment, unsustainable growth with high 
inflation, outstanding external vulnerability, these characterised the Hungarian eco-
nomic policy in the years preceding the crisis. By the beginning of the decade, the 
renewal of state institutions had gained key significance, however, it needed to be 
preceded by the reinforcement and consolidation of the state and the creation of 
firm macroeconomic underpinnings. The reason is that these institutional pillars are 
required for the development of a state operation capable of orienting the relevant 
social partners towards a cooperative behaviour and thus laying the foundations of a 
new method polity model, including a new management of public finances. 
In this study, first the significance of the institutional matrix, and more specifically, 
of confidence and cooperation, and then the framework of a cooperative state man-
agement of public finances are presented. Then a summary outline is given of the ac-
tions taken in this decade to reinforce the Hungarian state and allow the permanent 
renewal of state operation. In addition to Hungary, the identification of the criteria 
of a successful and efficient state is in the focus of decision-makers and research com-
munities all over the world, and the topicality of the issue is underlined by the fact 
that last year the Nobel Prize was awarded to an economist, namely Richard Thaler, 
who has given high priority to the study of correlations between state operation and 
individual and social (community) behaviour.1
Social confidence and cooperation as part of the 
institutional environment
In the absence of good rules and good forms of behaviour, sustainable economic de-
velopment is ruled out. Bad rules and forms of behaviour can cause serious damage: 
this is one of the fundamental propositions of the institutional approach, which is 
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increasingly accepted and widespread, and pervades also the proclamation of reforms 
in economics hanged out on the entrance of the London School of Economics last 
December.2 An “institutional background” can be considered optimum if the various 
institutional levels are cascaded: formal rules fit to informal ones, and written statutes 
do not break with the community’s past, experiences and cultural endowments. Dur-
ing the elaboration of formal rules, the cultural and social background that charac-
terises the particular community at the given moment (or period) must be taken into 
consideration in order to avoid unintended consequences. 
The stable institutional foundations also allow for the completely different paces 
of institutional development in the case of formal and informal institutions (rules). 
Formal rules may be changed overnight, however, the informal restrictions giving the 
framework of individual and collective behaviour only allow a gradual evolution. Con-
sequently, a regulation is good if it allows for the local conditions, and bad if it wants 
to press new forms of behaviour on the community going against them. 
Thus it may be accepted that the economy cannot be separated from the back-
ground of political and social institutions, as the rules of the game that determine indi-
vidual decisions are given by the political and social frames.3 Thus instead of restrictions 
binding individuals hand and foot in their decision or obstacles paralysing economic 
development, social institutions should rather be viewed as facilities capable of raising 
the standard of welfare if managed appropriately. There is no need to assume that the 
institutional background is unalterable: ultimately, economic and social change is noth-
ing else but the refinement of the institutional network, in other words, its adjustment 
to new challenges and situations. Historical experience underpins that a country’s com-
petitiveness depends to a large extent on the adaptability of the institutional system and 
matrix. A community can only be successful if it gives the right responses at the right 
time to appropriately asked questions. One of the main findings of North’s research was 
exactly that in less developed states the conservation of the backlog can only be traced 
back to the fact that, for various reasons, these states have been incapable of improving 
their institutions and creating a stable and low-risk institutional environment. There is a 
disagreement in the literature about the driving force of institutional development and 
the factors that are responsible for “getting stuck”, but there are general conditions that 
can typically be considered as the bases of development. According to Rodrik (2000), 
one such meta-institution is democracy, which allows the entire political and social com-
munity to decide on the direction of development. Another example includes the level 
of confidence and cooperation characterising a given society. In the absence of confi-
dence, transaction costs are high, and this renders the building up of an optimum insti-
tutional matrix impossible. A rising confidence level, however, gives the opportunity of 
building an institutional framework consistent with higher social welfare.
Williamson, another Nobel Prize winner of the institutional school, defined four 
levels of the institutional structure, built on one another, and having an impact on 
the performance of the economy and society in the broad sense of the word. The first 
level 1) comprises ethics, customs and norms, with the 2) fundamental rules of the 
institutional environment, 3) the management structures and 4) the daily decisions 
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and institutional solutions used for the allocation of resources settled as the next 
layers, respectively. Confidence between the state and the affected social groups cor-
responds to the second level, which may not be irrespective of the fundamental rules 
and relationships of the given community, and which is capable of determining the 
management structures and, through them, daily decision-making.
Fundamentals of cooperative state operation
Our basic proposition is that a state capable of building a cooperative relationship 
with its citizens, the business sector, banks and all other affected parties (collectively 
referred to as stakeholders) can be more successful than the one that is incapable of 
doing so.4 As a result of this, and accepting that the higher level satisfaction of social 
needs inevitably entail a demand for an efficient partnership, in this study the ques-
tion of bringing the state closer to this cooperative operation will be tackled. This 
study is built on two presumptions.
1) The effect of state actions depends greatly on environmental factors, with the 
level of confidence and cooperation between the state and the stakeholders having 
particular significance.
2) The “state of the country” (status), evolving on the basis of the existence or ab-
sence of cooperation between the state and the stakeholders largely determines if the 
state is capable of prompting the affected social groups to act cooperatively.
As a starting point, in this study it is presumed that the quality of state operation 
(economic policy) can be reasonably improved by making stakeholders5, especially 
the market and other state participants
– interested in the success of state actions;
– identify themselves with the objectives of state operation, the particular state ac-
tion or programme;
– commit themselves to the achieving the state objectives.
In a certain sense, efficient state operation is the achievement of the above-de-
scribed “status”, as it means cooperation between the state and stakeholders in the 
broad sense, and it is presumed that it is more efficient than the mode of operation 
built on the absence of cooperation. As the reinforcement of public confidence may 
result in a beneficial commonality of interests, the renewal of state operation should 
be conducive to cooperation and the reinforcement of public confidence at the level 
of basic principles, objectives, the target system and the targeted structure, as well as 
in practice, promoting change not only in specific action but also in the approach 
(frame of mind, attitude, value system) vis-a-vis the state. 
The other presumption in this study concerns the interaction of cooperative and 
non-cooperative forms of behaviour. In this framework, the two extreme polity mod-
els include the cooperative and the non-cooperative states. A state is considered to 
behave cooperatively if it sets up a framework and regulations that are optimal for 
the partners required to observe the rules. In contrast, a state’s non-cooperative ap-
proach includes mistrust of the stakeholders, and for this reason the typical regulatory 
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instrument of such a state is the excessive encumbrance of those expected to comply 
with the rules. The above descriptions are simplistic, due primarily to the fact that the 
adopted polity model may manifest in various ways in specific situations, and in the 
case of certain state actions, the scope of the relevant partners may, of course, differ.6
Depending on the stakeholders’ response to state behaviour, in our pattern, four 
different status may be achieved:
1) cooperative state with cooperating stakeholders: this is the well managed state, 
with mutual cooperation between the government and the stakeholders (to give an 
example from the field of taxation: the government levies low taxes and taxpayers 
have high tax awareness and propensity to pay taxes);
2) cooperating state with non-cooperating stakeholders: stakeholders respond to 
the state’s supportive behaviour in a non-cooperative manner, in other words, they 
practically exploit the elbowroom given by virtue of the government’s behaviour (re-
turning to the previous example: in this case taxes are low but tax evasion is high, and 
the size of the shadow economy is considerable);
3) non-cooperative state with cooperative stakeholders: this is the opposite of the 
previous state, when the society is cooperative (presumably arising from the state co-
operation in a previous state), but the state is not (using the tax policy example, this 
means that there is a propensity and capacity to pay taxes, and the state responds by 
overtaxing and an excessive curtailing of incomes);
4) non-cooperative state and non-cooperative stakeholders: this is the state of dis-
trust, when neither the state nor the stakeholders are characterised by a cooperative 
attitude (the government levies enormous taxes and the taxpayers’ typical approach 
is to evade them).
In a social perspective, the optimum state of affairs is the well-managed state, as 
both the cooperating parties and, indirectly, the entire society benefit from coop-
eration, because it contributes to the improvement of public confidence and to the 
implementation of public welfare as the utmost social goal. It can be readily accepted 
that neither a “state using up its social basis”, nor a “naive state” are sustainable (bal-
anced), in contrast to the state of affairs when neither the state nor the stakeholders 
are cooperative, as the latter may also represent equilibrium, since no one is capable 
of improving by merely changing his/her/its own behaviour. Transition between the 
two equilibrium states is not self-evident: the main question is the stakeholders’ re-
sponse to the state’s cooperative behaviour.
Table 1: Cooperation matrix for the state and the stakeholders
Cooperating partners Non-cooperating partners
Cooperating state “Well-managed, incentivising state” “Naive and exploited state”
Non-cooperative state “State using up its own social basis” “Non-cooperative, punishing state”
Source: Edited by the author
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From the right bottom corner of the matrix, representing a suboptimum posi-
tion, the left upper corner representing the Pareto optimum, can only be reached 
if state cooperation coincides with cooperation by the partners. This means that 
in order to achieve the condition of a cooperating state, the state needs to be sure 
that the response to its cooperative actions will be cooperation instead of a con-
tinuation of the previous non-cooperative.7 As a precondition, this requires the 
reinforcement of the state, as permanent cooperation is only conceivable between 
equal parties, as a weak state cannot develop a cooperative environment, and only 
an efficient and powerful state is capable of getting the private sector to perma-
nently cooperate.
It must also be taken into consideration that in the case of the structural reforms, 
which provide the basis for strengthening the state, costs exceed benefits over the 
short term, but in the long term, the beneficial effects outweigh costs.8
Figure 1: Steps in the development of operation as a cooperative state
Strengthening 
of the state
Non-cooperative 
state operation, 
non-cooperative 
stakeholders
Opportunity for 
a cooperative 
state operation
Change in 
stakeholder 
incentives
Suboptimal state 
operation
Source: Edited by the author
Below is an analysis of the way the government actions taken since the early 2010s 
have facilitated the strengthening of the Hungarian state, in other word, the way they 
have laid the foundations for the Hungarian government’s shift towards cooperative 
operation. The authors hope this study will be followed by analyses focusing on the 
second phase in building a well-managed state, presenting the areas where the expan-
sion of the cooperative polity attitude is demonstrable.
Hungary’s economy before the crisis
The decade that started in 2000 saw macroeconomic developments in Hungary that 
turned the Hungarian economy from a spearhead to a tail-end Charlie in the region, 
and proved that imbalances leads the entire economy to an unsustainable trajectory.
1) The starting point of economic problems is the failed and irresponsible budget 
policy, as explained by Baksay and Palotai (2017). The budget deficit was salient even 
in a regional comparison, the state spent a lot on social transfers and little on produc-
tive goals (pension costs amounted to more than 20 percent of the budget spend-
ing). Year after year the Hungarian government spent 6 to 8 percent of its given an-
nual economic performance more than its revenues. Naturally, the missing amount 
had to be financed primarily from external loans, and as a result, deficit stuck at a 
high level triggered a substantial rise in the sovereign debt. Hungary’s sovereign 
debt amounted to 55 percent of GDP in 2002, this ratio had risen to 65 percent by 
2007, and to 80% by 2010. In addition to the significant rise in the sovereign debt in 
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absolute terms, its structure also changed in an unfavourable direction (high FX and 
foreign debt).
2) The disequilibrium had its impact felt in all the other areas of the economy, 
of which the labour market is of paramount significance. Although in the decade 
preceding the crisis the activity rate started to increase, in a regional comparison it 
still remained low. In Hungary hardly more than 60 percent of the 15-60 age group 
were on the labour market, while the corresponding average of the EU15 exceeded 
70 percent, and the Czech Republic had the same labour market activity. In all these, 
the state’s responsibility can be clearly demonstrated, as the low employment rate was 
accompanied by high and unfavourably structured work-related taxes, and by a system 
of social transfers. In the case of a single employee paid an average wage or salary, in 
2007 taxes exceeded 50 percent, two-thirds of them being employer and employee 
contributions. Only Belgium had a higher tax wedge among the OECD countries, 
the corresponding values were slightly above 40 percent in the Czech Republic and 
Poland, and below 40 percent in Slovakia. 
3)  The budget deficit led to increasing external indebtedness, while wage hike 
and the transfers to the population resulted in excessive consumptions and conse-
quently, lower savings. Dues to the soaring deficit and declining savings, the current 
account deficit rose and led to increasing external indebtedness. Between 2002 and 
2006 the state’s financing requirement amounted to 7 to 8 percent of GDP, while 
household savings never exceeded 2 percent of GDP. 
4) It represented a serious threat that up to the eruption of the crisis, household 
loans rose rapidly. The loan portfolio of the household sector to the available income 
approached 80 percent, while this ratio was 20 percent lower in the regional partner 
countries. A particular challenge included the fact that lending shifted towards for-
eign currency loans, and by 2008 households’ open FX position had amounted to 
nearly 20 percent of GDP, as against 2000, when Hungarian families were still net sav-
ers up to 5 percent of GDP.
5) All this was combined with high inflation, considerably above the regional aver-
age, for the most part due to tax hikes. With the erosion of discipline, monetary policy 
was rigorous, resulting in high real interests. All this naturally contributed to a surge 
in FX lending.
The unsustainable fiscal and monetary developments seen in the years preced-
ing the crisis caused stability and competitiveness problems, and as a result, Hun-
gary was incapable of making use of the opportunities offered by the 2004 accession 
to the European Union: in a regional comparison, Hungary’s growth data remained 
moderate, and duality in the economy, i.e. SME  productivity remained consider-
ably below that of large companies, became a fundamental barrier to closing the 
gap. The growth financed from increasing indebtedness and driven by consumption 
concealed structural problems, and the evolution of a debt spiral was facilitated by 
the fact that the Constitution in force before 2011 failed to include a chapter on 
public finances, in other words, no constitutional rule limited excessive sovereign 
indebtedness. 
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Strengthening Hungarian public finances
When the economic crisis fed through to Hungary between 2007 and 2009, fiscal 
adjustment fell simultaneously. The combined effects of crisis and tightening resulted 
in a considerable recession, and the challenges could only be managed by applying 
unconventional economic policy instruments (Matolcsy and Palotai, 2016). 
Parliament approved the Fundamental Law, the basis of renewal in public finances 
and in economic policy, in April 2011, and this started a new chapter, among others, in 
public finance management in Hungary, allowing the renewal of the entire system of 
public finances. For the purpose of this analysis, the following regulations of the Funda-
mental Law (which provide the basis for the debt rule) can be considered important.9
 “(4) The National Assembly may not adopt an Act on the central budget as a re-
sult of which state debt would exceed half of the Gross Domestic Product.
(5) As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the National 
Assembly may only adopt an Act on the central budget which provides for state debt 
reduction in proportion to the Gross Domestic Product.
(6) Any derogation from the provisions of Paragraphs (4) and (5) shall only be 
allowed during a  special legal order and to the extent necessary to mitigate the con-
sequences of the circumstances  triggering the special legal order, or, in case of an 
enduring and significant national economic  recession, to the extent necessary to 
restore the balance of the national economy.”
A debt rule raised to a constitutional level is a requirement affecting the entire 
economic policy, as the debt to GDP can only be reduced sustainably if all the eco-
nomic policy lines set it as their objective. The success of the “Hungarian method” is 
well illustrated by the fact that in contrast to the sharp increase in the sovereign debt 
before 2010, after that year it started to fall: from above 80 percent, debt to GDP fell to 
around (below) 75 percent. Meanwhile the ratio of FX debt to the total debt dropped 
from above 50 percent to 25 percent, which means that the FX debt was halved. 
Meanwhile, a genuine turnaround was achieved in the real economy as well. La-
bour market developments deserve a special mention. By 2014 the activity and the 
employment rates had risen by 6 percent on 2007, representing one of the fastest rises 
in the European Union. From the beginning of the crisis, activity increase had primar-
ily been driven by welfare transfers and tax restructuring.
Below is an outline of the most important economic policy actions taken in Hun-
gary during the renewal period after 2010, which allowed the above developments 
and state reinforcement.10
Stabilisation of Hungarian public finances
Fiscal trends and turnaround
One of the clearest indications of deterioration in Hungarian public finances was the 
surge in the budget deficit followed by stabilisation at a high level. As a result, 
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Figure 2:  Gross public debt forecast, calculated at an unchanged (end-of-2016) exchange rate 
over the forecast horizon 
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Figure 3: Labour market developments (2007-2017)
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Hungary was under the European Union’s Excessive Deficit Procedure between 2004 
and 2013. Fixing public finances started during 2010 and 2011, when the balance 
calculated according to the then valid methodology of the European Union suddenly 
rocketed to 4% of GDP. After 2012, the budget deficit remained below 3 percent 
of GDP according to every EU-compatible indicator. Deficit decrease was due to an 
improvement in the primary balance (net of the interest balance), and to falling net 
interest costs after 2013.
Figure 4: Fiscal position (2000-2016)
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Source: Matolcsy, 2017b
The improvement in Hungary’s fiscal balance was outstanding even in an inter-
national comparison: after the crisis the Hungarian budget balance improved at the 
highest rate among the EU Member States. Between 2003 and 2007 the fiscal deficit 
was around 7 percent of GDP in Hungary. A  similar deficit could only be seen in 
Greece. However, in 2014 and 2015, Hungary’s deficit fell to around 2 percent, rep-
resenting a 5-percent improvement, as against Germany, showing the second highest 
improvement with its improvement below 3 percent.
The most important fiscal and other reforms affecting the budget included the Table 2.
In the above list, special emphasis should be placed on the tax reform, which 
included, as an iconic step, the transformation of the personal income tax regime, 
cutting taxes by 2.5 percent of GDP on the whole.11 After the 2011 adoption of a flat-
rate personal income tax, the tax wedge fell from the nearly 60-percent measured in 
2009 below 50 percent, and thus the Hungarian tax regime partly closed the gap to 
the international community (Varga, 2017a).
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Table 2: Reforms After 2010
Tax reform Expenditure cuts Debt management Other measures
Reduction of work-related 
taxes
Adoption of a flat-rate per-
sonal income tax
Family allowance
Job protection action plan
Increasing consumption 
and turnover taxes (excise 
and VAT)
Levying taxes on extra 
profits
Structural Reform 
Programme
Review of the inva-
lidity pensions
Tightening early 
retirement
Cutting the period 
of subsidies paid 
for the unem-
ployed
Permanent reduc-
tion in govern-
ment debt
Reducing the 
share of FX loans
Improving the 
basis of Hungar-
ian investors
Increasing the 
average term
Community service
Phasing out of FX 
loans (conversion to 
HUF)
Reform of the private 
pension fund plan
Source: Matolcsy, 2017a
Figure 5: Transformation of the personal income tax regime
2011
Flat-rate personal income tax Family tax allowance
2012
Complete phase-out of tax credit
2013
Complete phase-out of “super grossing”
2014
Extension of family tax allowance to contributions
2016
1% reduction in personal income tax Increase in the family tax allowance
Source: Matolcsy, 2017a
Work-related taxes were replaced by consumption taxes, and the average personal 
income tax rate on the average wage was reduced from more than 20 percent in 2009 
to 15 percent in 2016, placing Hungary below the average of the European Union. 
The Hungarian tax regime was placed on a new footing: work and capital-related 
taxes fell, while the revenues from consumption and special taxes increased (Palotai, 
2017). The tax system became focused on consumption and performance. It pays to 
work hard and have a higher performance. Special taxes provided substantial support 
to the budget: These revenues amounted to 2 percent of GDP in 2013 and still nearly 
1.5 in 2016. Between 2010 and 2012, the most significant special taxes included the 
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one levied on financial institutions (bank levy) and the income tax imposed on the 
power sector, while after 2013, the duty payable on financial transactions became the 
most important item.
Figure 6: The cumulated static effect of the 2010 tax changes on the budget
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Consolidation of local governments
Prevention of the regeneration of local government debt is a common national eco-
nomic interest. While the financial balance of local governments deteriorated con-
siderably between 2007 and 2010, financial risks increased.12 As local governments 
assumed liabilities in excess of their actual financial capacities, central debt relief be-
came unavoidable, as the bankruptcy of local governments in large masses would have 
caused unpredictable problems in the national budget. The government relieved lo-
cal governments of their debts in three steps.
1) First, the debts of villages with a headcount below 5000, amounting to 1710, 
were assumed in the framework of tax consolidation.
2) In the second step of debt consolidation, the state assumed part of the debts 
of the local governments of communities with a headcount exceeding 5000, in the 
amount outstanding at the end of 2012, and their charges accrued up to the date of 
assumption. 
24
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3) The last phase of local government debt consolidation was performed in the 
spring of 2014, when the state also assumed the debts of municipalities with a popula-
tion exceeding 5000. The total cost of the debt consolidation amounted to HUF 1300 
billion.
It was also recorded that a local government may only have a share in a business 
if its responsibility does not exceed its financial contribution, and that a local govern-
ment’s business activity may not jeopardize the performance of its mandatory duties. 
As from 1 January 2012, several restrictions apply to local governments’ debt generat-
ing transactions (borrowing, security issuance). These rules are set out in the Stabil-
ity Act. Local governments may validly enter into debt-generating transactions, other 
than small-scale ones, only with the central government’s preliminary approval. An-
other regulation that serves the stabilisation of finances in the local government sec-
tor is that since 2013, no operating loss may be planned in local government budgets. 
As from 1 January 2012, the healthcare institutions maintained by county institutions 
and the Local Government of Budapest and as from 1 May 2012, the hospitals main-
tained by community governments were transferred to state maintenance. 
Reform of the social security system
At the end of 2010, Hungary was challenged by an increasing budget deficit gener-
ated by the mandatory private pension funds, while the budget deficit target set by the 
European Union had to be met. In response, the government terminated the “state 
umbrella” protecting private funds, and as a result, huge numbers of fund members re-
turned to the public pension plan. This transformation was especially necessary because 
approximately one-fourth of the pension payable for private pension fund members 
flew to these funds, and as a result of the PAYG scheme, the current revenues provid-
ing a coverage for pension costs fell considerably, and the generated deficit had to be 
financed from the central budget. This mechanism automatically led to a rise in the 
sovereign debt in the phase preceding the fund members’ retirement.13 The sustainabil-
ity of the public pension scheme remained a relevant issue after the reform, as demo-
graphic and employment-related factors must also be taken into consideration in this 
context, while the extremely high ratio of very low paid employees is another problem 
in Hungary. The solution may be in the encouragement to have children and in increas-
ing employment, which have been promoted by numerous actions in recent years.
Healthcare, the other pillar of the social security system, influences a country’s 
economic capacity primarily through the amount and quality of available manpower 
by affecting the active time spent in work and labour productivity. The concept word-
ed in the Semmelweis Programme, inseparably related to the New Széchenyi Plan, 
focussed on raising funds and the government’s increased responsibility in order to 
help healthcare recover after the crisis and to rebuild it. 
– In the framework of the Semmelweis Programme a public institutional system 
for health organisation was built to manage the patients’ path and perform functional 
integration in order to improve sector efficiency through resource allocation.
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– Gradual increase in the real value of health-related public expenditures paved 
the way to the moderation or elimination of erroneous and damaging incentives of 
financing, and to the retention of qualified labour. Included in the economy develop-
ment strategy, the Semmelweis Programme “does not consider healthcare as a sector 
immoderately exhausting public funds, but as a significant potential engine for the 
economy”. 
– Wage increases in healthcare, the 70 percent rise in financing primary health-
care, the consolidation of hospital debts and the structural changes implemented to 
reduce debt over the long term all contribute to the sustainable operation of health-
care. The control of certified public data and procedures, and the renewal through 
giving preference to patients’ interests and patient security over the interests of the 
care system may have a key role in modernisation. Restoring the prestige of freelance 
physicians and medicine in general, and the integration of private resources into the 
system are also pivotal.
Renewal of public finance audit
With the entry into force of the Fundamental Law, a new era started in both public 
finance discipline and control. A chapter on public finances, including several rigor-
ous provisions about the management of public funds, was added to the Fundamental 
Law (see above).
1) Following the adoption of the Fundamental Law, Act LXVI of 2011 on the State 
Audit Office was the first cardinal law adopted by the National Assembly. The purpose 
of the new regulatory framework, effective as from 1 July 2011, is to improve the ef-
ficiency of the State Audit Office’s operation and action to protect the taxpayers’ 
money and the nation’s wealth. Pursuant to the new act, the State Audit Office has 
become one of the most significant elements in the system of economic checks and 
balances that ensure the democratic operation of the Hungarian state. The new stat-
ute introduced numerous important changes, as it extended the SAO’s audit powers, 
perceptibly increased the organisation’s independence and made the audit office’s 
work more transparent. The act grants extensive powers to the State Audit Office, in 
other words, the SAO is entitled, as a general rule, to check the use of any public fund 
or publicly owned asset.
2) The Fundamental Law raises the Fiscal Council among the organisations of a 
constitutional status, equal to the State Audit Office and the National Bank of Hunga-
ry (MNB). The Council’s powers stem from the Fundamental Law, as its duty is exactly 
to enforce the constitutional rule of debt, and not to allow it remain merely a written 
word. The Fundamental Law stipulates that in order to reduce the debt portfolio, the 
Fiscal Council has the right of veto, and with this the Hungarian legislators undertook 
voluntary restraint.
In addition, numerous other laws were re-codified. Most significantly, the act on 
public finances, which was renewed and placed on a new footing.
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Turnaround in Monetary Policy
Through the renewal and wide application of the monetary policy instruments, in 
2013 the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) joined the central banks that wished to 
mitigate the consequences of the crisis by a proactive monetary policy, with some ac-
tions taken in a new approach in addition to traditional ones (see Parragh, 2017). In 
compliance with its duty stipulated in the MNB Act, it launched several programmes 
in support of economy stabilisation and the government’s economy policy endeav-
ours.14 For the purpose of developing a well-managed state, the following are consid-
ered as the most important. The central bank’s actions are presented on the basis of 
Matolcsy and Palotai, 2016 and Kolozsi, 2017. 
Interest rate-cutting cycles and monetary easing
Between 2012 and 2016, the Monetary Council lowered the initial 7 percent central 
bank base rate to 0.9 percent in three interest rate-cutting cycles, altogether 32 inter-
est rate-cutting steps, and loan rates and money-market yields fell in parallel. Such a 
long easing cycle and such a low nominal interest rate had been unprecedented in 
Hungary since the change of regime. At the beginning of the interest cut cycle, infla-
tion was around 6 percent, and from the end of 2013, the inflation started to reason-
ably decline. Once the 0.9 percent base rate had been reached, the MNB committed 
to maintain the base rate at a permanently low level. 
Figure 7: The central bank’s base rate and developments in interest rate expectations
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Lowering the base rate and easing monetary conditions: 1) it reduced the in-
terbank and securities market rates; 2) it supported economic growth and the me-
dium-term achievement of the inflation target; 3) it reduced credit limits; 4) it 
prevented further drastic drops in consumption and investments. Due to the more 
relaxed monetary conditions, in 2017 HUF 600 billion HUF interest was saved by 
the government, amounting to a total of HUF 1600 billion since 2013.15 Interest 
rate cuts increased economic growth by about 1.1 percentage points in the aggre-
gate.16
The adoption of lending incentive programmes
As one of the first actions of the 2013 monetary policy turnaround, the MNB launched 
a targeted lending programme to stop decline in lending to small and medium-sized 
businesses, a sector of outstanding significance in employment, and allow lending 
processes normalise. In addition to the third, deregulatory phase of the Funding for 
Growth Scheme, at the end of 2015, under the name Market-Based Lending Scheme, 
the central bank also announced a programme in support of transition to market-
based lending.
In the framework of the programme, lending and leasing transactions served new 
investments in the amount of approx. HUF 1700 billion, while the Funding for Growth 
Scheme contributed 2 percent to economic growth between 2013 and 2016, increas-
ing the employee headcount by approximately 20.000. In order to facilitate transition 
to a market economy, in January 2016, the MNB launched the Market-Based Lending 
Scheme, which, in combination with the Funding for Growth Scheme, contributes 
greatly to keeping the extension of SME lending in the 5-10 band required for sustain-
able economic growth.
Self-Financing Programme: the reduction of external vulnerability
Prior to the launching of the Self-Financing Programme, i.e. between 2014 and 2016, 
due to the increased amount of forints issued, the Hungarian government was able 
to repay approximately EUR 11 billion (HUF 3400 billion) from the HUF seignior-
age income. Its role in bank financing also increased significantly: by 2016 foreign 
investors had been replaced by domestic banks as the most important owners in 
the market of HUF-denominated government securities. Between 2011 and 2015, 
foreign investors predominated in the HUF-denominated government securities 
market. However, at the end of the first six months of 2017, the ratio of Hungarian 
sectors exceeded 80 percent. Credit institutions’ share rose from 30 to 37 percent, 
while the households’ increased from about 5 to above 20 percent (in 2012, the gov-
ernment made increase in government securities in household ownership a strategic 
goal). The ratio of foreign currency in the sovereign debt fell from 42 percent in 
2014 to 25 percent in 2016, which roughly corresponded to the value recorded in 
2008, before the crisis.17
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Phasing-out of household FX loans and their conversion to HUF
The indebtedness of the population in foreign currency had been one of the high-pri-
ority risks in the Hungarian economy since the early 2000s. The risks and system-level 
challenges justified the government’s action against uncollateralised household FX 
loans (Nagy, 2010; Nagy and Prugberger, 2011), and in 2014-2015 also the conversion 
of FX and  FX-denominated loans.18  FX loans were phased out in two phases (first, 
household FX-based and FX mortgage loans, and then other household FX loans). 
Within this framework the MNB selling approx. EUR 9.7 billion to banks without the 
central bank’s reserves falling below the expected international standards. As a result 
of conversion to HUF and the settlement of accounts, Hungary’s financial stability 
improved considerably, as did risk control. This is why the phasing-out of household 
FX loans, especially coupled with the Self-Financing Programme, could be one of the 
actions credit rating agencies specified as a reason for upgrading the debt of Hungary.
Turnaround in competitiveness
A national economy is competitive if it optimises the use its available human, physi-
cal and natural resources in the interest of the highest possible but still sustainable 
level of welfare (MNB, 2017a, p. 11). Firm foundations, a stable macroeconomy and 
financing, a potent and stable institutional background, streamlined and efficient 
regulation, and high-standard education and healthcare are indispensable for a com-
petitive economy, to serve as a basis for a smoothly operating and predictable envi-
ronment encouraging investments and innovation, and closing the gap over the long 
term may start.
The budgetary and monetary policy turnarounds performed since 2010 have re-
stored the macroeconomic equilibrium required for the improvement of competi-
tiveness, and after 2013, they allowed the economy to grow at a pace exceeding the 
average of the European Union. The fiscal measurements and the central bank’s 
actions facilitated economic development19 and increased employment,20 and in ad-
dition to the money and capital markets, the achievements of the growth-oriented 
economic policy are recognised by the international organisations and large credit 
rating agencies. However, a faster and permanent convergence requires an improve-
ment in the qualitative attributes of resources. For an escape from the medium-
developed economy status, the acceleration of convergence is indispensable, and 
requires reform actions performed with primary focus on the quality criteria of com-
petitiveness. In order to preserve the achievements made since 2010 and accelerate 
permanent convergence, it is indispensable to make efforts at improving efficiency 
and increasing value creating capacity and productivity (turnaround in competitive-
ness). In order to regain Hungary’s former regional leading position and to break 
free from the trap of medium development, the gap must be closed more rapidly 
than previously and the exploitation of the growth pattern needs to be carried on 
and improved.
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Figure 8: Reforms in competitiveness and turnarounds in economic policy
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Epilogue
As a combined effect of debt reduction, fiscal stabilization and the turnaround in 
monetary policy, in 2013 Hungary could start to close the gap. As a prerequisite of the 
polity model change the state had to be reinforced, and the framework for co-opera-
tion between the state and various social groups had to be developed. After accepting 
the institutional foundations brought once again into the limelight, parallel with in-
crease in the demand for reforms, rise in social confidence and cooperation may al-
low the creation of a higher-standard state operation. As a first step in the creation of 
an appropriate institutional background, the state was reinforced and is now capable 
of receiving cooperative responses from the relevant social groups, especially market 
participants and citizens, to its own cooperative actions. This study describes the steps 
that highly facilitated the reinforcement of the Hungarian state, and through this, the 
transition to a cooperative polity model and the change in the entire state operation. 
Arising from the achievements made in recent years, the Hungarian state has al-
ready got sufficient elbowroom to take actions that presume both a room to manoeu-
vre and sufficient weight to enforce a cooperative response from the stakeholders to 
the government’s initiatives at cooperation. The following include, but are not on any 
account limited to, more significant examples of actions taken in the direction of a 
well-governed state:
– Tax cut policy, which, in combination with an improvement in tax compliance 
and the renewal of tax collection (NAV 2.0 concept), shows that the state is gaining 
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strength, and that it is a government strategy affecting large masses and representing 
cooperation between the state and taxpayers. Prior to the adoption of the flat-rate 
personal income tax, the tax base was the income increased by 27 percent VAT, and 
the rates were 17 and 32 percent. Currently, the tax base is not adjusted, i.e. the tax 
base is more than one quarter less, and the rate is uniformly 15 percent. In addition, 
tax credits have been terminated and the available family tax allowance has increased 
considerably. However, in comparison to the size of tax cuts, personal income tax 
decrease was considerably smaller: while in 2010, the amount collected as personal 
income tax was 6.4 percent of GDP, in 2017 it amounted to 5.2 percent, representing 
an increase in nearly HUF 200 billion in nominal terms. These values are modified 
by numerous factors, however, the trend shows that the tax payment morale may have 
improved (in the case of VAT that trend was even more obvious).
– Constructive cooperation between monetary and fiscal policies, representing a 
break with the previous practice of competitive and contrasting operation of the cen-
tral bank and the government, and making efforts at the achievement of economic 
policy objectives via synergies, while maintaining the central bank’s independence. 
There is a long list of economic policy areas jointly affected by fiscal and monetary 
policies, and the jointly managed economic policy challenges (for more details, see 
Matolcsy and Palotai, 2016), but perhaps the most conspicuous example for construc-
tive cooperation was the phasing out (conversion into HUF) of household FX loans, 
which could not have been implemented without a coordinated action of the govern-
ment and the central bank.
– The central bank’s programmes based on the voluntary cooperation by banks, 
which are successful because of banks’ constructive and cooperative response to the 
MNB’s incentives. In the case of the Self-Financing Programme launched in 2014, the 
combined and complementary transformation of the MNB’s instruments, the nega-
tive FX issuance by the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) and the bank 
sector’s demand for government securities promote the implementation of the self-
financing concept, i.e. reduction of the country’s exposure and thus vulnerability to 
the rest of the world. In this programme, the ratio of FX in the sovereign debt fell 
from 50 percent to 25 percent. In the course of the Market-Based Lending Scheme 
launched in 2016, the banks with access to the central bank’s instruments undertake 
a lending commitment, which is, by definition, a kind of cooperation with the other 
participants of the banking system and with the central bank. Lending undertaken by 
the banks has allowed a shift in the SME developments from the previous drop to a 
5-10 percent annual rise.
– The transformation of public finance audit, with the reinforced State Audit Of-
fice adopting and operating programmes which “channel” the behaviour of the users 
of public funds. Examples include the State Audit Office’s Integrity Project, launched 
in 2011 for an annual measuring of the public sector’s corruption risks and the level 
of their control. The State Audit Office’s courses endeavouring to share good practice 
in public finances fit well to this advisory role: in addition to revealing errors, in the 
course of inspections, the auditors also meet forward-looking management solutions 
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and good practices they subsequently share with the stakeholders in the framework 
of the seminar series entitled “Good Examples Are Contagious. Best Practices in Us-
ing Public Funds”. Between 2011 and 2017, the State Audit Office organised 17 such 
seminars. Another kind of steering role is undertaken by the State Audit Office’s news 
portal that allows for the daily tracking of the work done at the office, thus setting an 
example for the entire public finance system in respect of transparency.
Due to the state’s position as a special economic participant and a regulator, it can 
substantially contribute to the improvement of the national economy’s competitive-
ness. The improvement of competitiveness requires the efficient application of coor-
dinated and targeted action packages, which was subject to the renewal and strength-
ening of the Hungarian state, as an indispensable precondition, implemented ever 
since 2010. 
Looking ahead, both the paradigm change that may lead to a state operation pro-
actively applying positive incentives and making efforts at partnership, and the insti-
tutionalisation of the achievements made so far are of strategic significance. “Institu-
tions matter”, Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass C. North’s theorem, which 
has become something like a catchphrase, can thus be affirmed in contrast to the 
neoclassical doctrine. The rules of the game set by the given political and social frame-
work determine and shape the decisions made by social stakeholders, and especially 
markets and individuals, in other words, the stable and efficient institutional matrix 
presumes the building up of a state that encourages the entire society to cooperate. 
As in the case of the informal frameworks that determine individual and collective 
behaviour to a major extent, improvement may only be gradual, and so transition to 
a cooperative polity model needs time. Hungary’s current leverage is due exactly to 
the fact that the stabilising actions and economic policy turnarounds implemented in 
this decade provide an appropriate basis for a switch to a polity model built on trust. 
Notes
1  Perhaps the most relevant part of Thaler’s heritage concerns government institutions set up for the 
purpose of steering and pushing individuals in the direction that represent a more optimum output at 
a community level (nudge units).
2  33 Theses for an Economics Reformation. http://www.newweather.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/33-
Theses-for-an-Economics-Reformation.pdf. 
3  What is an “institution”? This concept was first used by the renowned American lawyer and economist, 
Walton Hamilton, in 1919, and the American economist John R. Commons, a follower of institutional-
ism, was the first to point out the complexity of the concept of an “institution”. The term “institution” 
includes written laws and regulations, unwritten norms, culture and habits, in other words, all the “col-
lective frameworks” that influence and channel an individual’s behaviour. The history of ideas consider 
Thorstein Veblen as the founder of institutional economics. The Norwegian-American economist was 
the first to widely emphasise that economic behaviour largely depends on the social institutions and the 
environment of the economic actors, and consequently, one and the same kind of solution is inapplica-
ble to countries with completely different backgrounds and operation. 
4  According to Domokos, 2016, the opportunity for the state to implement good governance is given in 
the framework of gradual reforms, through becoming a reliable and efficient partner, and by the adop-
tion of a two-phase strategy. 
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5  About the stakeholder approach see Kecskés, 2011, p. 43.
6  In the frame of cooperation, persons and organisations act in concert to achieve common goals, on 
the one hand, and the practice of arriving at an agreement between stakeholders is also improved, on 
the other. Cooperation between the participants gives way to an increase in the economic and social 
benefit.
7  To put it simple, in a game theory approach, the question is practically: when the payment matrix be-
comes from a prisoner’s dilemma to a stag hunt. Here we dispense with its detailed explanation.
8  Structural reforms cause changes in the deep layers of the economy and the society through altering 
the institutional framework, the legislative environment and the institutional rules. They change public 
thinking and the improvement of the state brings the improvement of public confidence in its train. See 
Matolcsy, 2015, p. 232.
9  See Articles 33-44 of the Fundamental Law (chapter on public finances).
10  Although these rules limited the powers of National Assembly, they were indispensable for the creation 
of the new framework of public finances. See Kecskés, 2015.
11  For further details and the consequences see Baksay and Csomós, 2015.
12  The businesses in the majority ownership of local governments also piled a significant amount of debt 
because up to 2011 the State Audit Office had not been authorised by law to audit businesses in local 
government ownership. Local governments, on the other hand, did not pay sufficient attention to con-
trolling the indebtedness of their businesses.
13  There are also several other arguments in support of transformation (low actual costs, high costs borne 
by members, below-the-expected development in the Hungarian capital market, etc.).
14  For more details about the central bank’s actions see Lehmann et al., 2017.
15  About this correlation, see Csomós and Kicsák, 2015.
16  At the end of 2017, market investors already welcomed the MNB’s easing policy. See Eder, 2017.
17  See Kolozsi and Hoffmann, 2016; Nagy and Kolozsi, 2017
18  Conversion to HUF was performed in a period when both the legal background and the economic 
conditions were given (see Kolozsi et al., 2015).
19  Economic growth has exceeded 3 percent on average since 2013. 
20  In mid-2010 the employee headcount was 3.7 million, which had increased to 4.4 million by 2016.
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